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PLAYING HOT POTATO WITH COPA: THE SUPREME COURT 
DEFERS DECIDING WHETHER THE CHILD ONLINE 
PROTECTION ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL ONCE AGAIN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following: one day after school, your child goes online to 
complete a homework assignment requiring the research of a favorite cartoon 
character.  Using a popular search engine, your child types in “Pokemon” and 
begins a search.  The search retrieves well over five million results. Your child 
scrolls through the search results and selects a website.  This particular 
website, to which your child was allowed unfettered access, happens to be 
pornographic with extreme, graphic examples of sexual behavior.  
Surprisingly, many major children’s characters, including “Pokemon,” “My 
Little Pony,”1 and popular names such as “Disney,” “Barbie,” and “ESPN,”2 
are linked to thousands of pornographic websites.  In fact, the unintentional 
exposure to online pornography experienced by your child is commonplace: of 
the 95% of 15-17 year olds who have used the Internet, 70% have accidentally 
stumbled across pornography.3  Inevitably, after your child’s encounter with 
online pornography, you immediately appreciate a larger problem.  While the 
Internet serves as a wonderful teaching tool for your child, providing access to 
educational resources and the opportunity to explore hobbies and interests, it 
also contains harmful material, which you, your child’s school and library, and 
perhaps the government need to shield children.  To your astonishment, you 
discover that the Supreme Court has twice left undecided the issue of whether 
the government can directly address this problem through Internet regulation. 
Indeed, the problem of youth, pornography, and the Internet is expansive.  
Today’s computer-literate and Internet-savvy child explores an Internet 
containing more than 4.2 million pornographic websites. 4  The average age of 
 
 1. How Children Access Pornography on the Internet, at http://www.protectkids.com/ 
dangers/childaccess.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). ProtectKids.com is an Internet service aimed 
at increasing awareness of children’s exposure to online pornography and the ways parents and 
others can combat the negative impact such exposure has on children’s development. 
 2. Recent Statistics on Internet Dangers, at http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/stats.htm 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
 3. Id. 
 4. TopTenREVIEWS, Internet Pornography Statistics, at http://internet-filter-
review.toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
TopTenREVIEWS, comprised of product and industry experts, reviewers, marketers, and editors, 
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a child’s first exposure to Internet pornography is 11 years old;5 90% of 8-16 
year olds have viewed pornography online with the majority of the exposure 
having occurred while the youths were doing homework.6 
Experts agree that exposing a child to graphic sexual material is harmful in 
many ways. 7 Such exposure threatens to make children victims of sexual 
violence.8  One in five children utilizing computer chat rooms have been 
approached over the Internet by pedophiles.9  Eighty-nine percent of online 
sexual solicitations in 2001 were made in either chat rooms or via Instant 
Messages—communication programs that thirteen million children use 
regularly.10  Further, exposure to pornography may incite children to act out 
sexually against other children.11  Such exposure also interferes with a child’s 
development and identity.12 
Considering the accessibility of online pornography and the harm that such 
materials pose to children, the Supreme Court has recognized that society 
possesses a substantial interest in protecting its minors from the harmful effect 
of obscene material found online. 13  Indeed, the scope and range of interested 
 
is an online service aimed at aiding consumers seeking to buy Internet filters by providing 
research results pertaining to filtering software and the scope of the online pornography problem.  
TopTen REVIEWS, Company Profile, at http://www.toptenreviews.com/about-us.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
 5. TopTenREVIEWS, Internet Pornography Statistics, at http://internet-filter-review. 
toptenreviews.com/internet-pornography-statistics.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
 6. Recent Statistics on Internet Dangers, at http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/stats.htm 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
 7. See Harms of Porn and Resources, at http://www.protectkids.com/effects/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2005) (finding that exposure to Internet pornography threatens to make children 
victims of sexual violence; frequently results in illnesses, unplanned pregnancies, and sexual 
addiction; may incite children to act out sexually against other children; shapes attitudes; and 
interferes with a child’s development and identity). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Recent Statistics on Internet Dangers, at http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/stats.htm 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Harms of Porn and Resources, at http://www.protectkids.com/effects/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2005).  See also ProtectKids.com, Recent Statistics on Internet Dangers, at 
http://www.protectkids.com/dangers/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005) (describing two 
incidents where children between the ages of 11 and 13 viewed graphic, explicit materials online 
immediately preceding violent or sexual behavior). 
 12. How Pornography Harms Children, at http://www.protectkids.com/effects/harms.htm 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005). “Pornography often introduces children prematurely to sexual 
sensations that they are developmentally unprepared to contend with. This awareness of sexual 
sensation can be confusing and over-stimulating for children.”  Id. 
 13. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997) (striking down the Communications Decency 
Act, a statute prohibiting transmission of obscene online communications to minors, as 
unconstitutional: “We agreed that ‘there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors’ which extended to shielding them from indecent messages 
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parties is extensive, including schools, parents, libraries, concerned citizens, as 
well as sellers of technology-based Internet protection systems, and the online 
adult entertainment industry as a whole. 
However, irrespective of the need for Internet regulation, the Supreme 
Court has been unwilling to subject cyberspace to government regulation equal 
to that imposed on other communication media, namely radio and television.14  
Certainly, content-based regulation of any expressive medium raises First 
Amendment issues because the First Amendment provides that the government 
has no power to restrict expression based on the content of its message, its 
ideas, or its subject matter.15 
On October 22, 1998, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Child 
Online Protection Act, (“COPA”), seeking to shield children from sexually 
explicit Internet material by requiring the owners of pornographic websites to 
install age-verification systems on their webpages.16  The following day, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, (“ACLU”), filed suit to challenge COPA’s 
constitutionality. 17  COPA’s constitutionality has now been argued twice 
before the Supreme Court: first in 2002, (“Ashcroft I”), where the Court 
limited the scope of its decision in order to exclude any holding on the 
constitutionality of COPA, effectively failing to give Congress guidance as to 
the Supreme Court’s position on such Internet regulation,18 and then in 2004, 
(“Ashcroft II”), where Supreme Court left in place a preliminary injunction 
barring enforcement of COPA and sent the case back to a federal district court 
 
that are not obscene by adult standards” (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 
U.S. 115, 126 (1989)). 
 14. Robert Corn-Revere, Ashcroft v. ACLU II: The Beat Goes On, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 299, 310 (2004) (describing the Court’s treatment of other media, where it allowed 
government regulation of content, in comparison to its treatment of the Internet). 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 16. Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 302. 
 17. Supreme Court Leaves COPA Injunction in Place: Ashcroft v. ACLU, ANDREWS 
TELECOMM. INDUS. LITIG. REP., Jul. 13, 2004, at 3. 
 18. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585-86 (2002) [hereinafter “Ashcroft I”].  The 
majority asserted: 
The scope of our decision today is quite limited.  We only hold that COPA’s reliance on 
community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors does not by itself 
render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment.  We do 
not express any view as to whether COPA suffers from substantial overbreadth for other 
reasons, whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague, or whether the District Court 
correctly concluded that the statute likely will not survive a strict scrutiny analysis once 
adjudication of the case is completed below.  While respondents urge us to resolve these 
questions at this time, prudence dictates allowing the Court of Appeals to first examine 
these difficult issues. 
Id. 
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in Pennsylvania to be decided on the merits, yet again unwilling to give its 
opinion concerning the constitutionality of the act. 19 
Certainly, those monitoring the COPA debate and Internet censorship had 
hoped that Ashcroft II would provide real answers as to the Supreme Court’s 
position on governmental Internet regulation. 20  However, to the 
disappointment of Congress and other interested parties, the constitutionality 
of COPA remains in question because the Ashcroft II Court made only a basic 
interlocutory decision, finding that the federal district court did not abuse its 
discretion by enjoining the enforcement of COPA.21  Nevertheless, the 
Ashcroft II opinion gives some insight as to the Court’s stance, its reluctance to 
allow direct regulation of the Internet. 
This article will discuss the wide-ranging implications of the Court’s 
recent observations in Ashcroft II.  In choosing to decide Ashcroft II on an 
interlocutory matter, a narrow, practical holding, the Court deprived Congress 
of the guidance it needed regarding Internet regulation legislation.  By 
asserting that filtering software may be less restrictive than COPA, the Court 
has all but eradicated any hope that the Court might find COPA 
constitutional,22  thereby sending Congress back to the drawing board to draft 
another law designed to shield minors from harmful internet materials.23  
 
 19. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2783, 2791 (2004) [hereinafter “Ashcroft II”] 
(“Because we affirm the District Court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction for the 
reasons relied on by the District Court, we decline to consider the correctness of the other 
arguments . . .”). 
 20. Emily Vander Wilt, Comment, Considering COPA: A Look at Congress’s Second 
Attempt to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 406, 434 (2004).  
Wilt’s article relays that those following the COPA debate felt confident that the Court would 
resolve the COPA issue in the October 2003 Term.  Wilt, writing before Ashcroft II came before 
the Court,  predicted that “[a]fter consuming innumerable hours of judicial resources and 
engendering a wealth of speculation about its destiny, the constitutionality of COPA will finally 
be settled this Term, when the Supreme Court considers the statute for the second time [in 
Ashcroft II].”  Id. 
 21. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2791. 
 22. Perry A. Craft & Michael G. Sheppard, Framed by the Times: 2003-2004 U.S. Supreme 
Court Decisions Reflect Current Events, 40 TENN. B. J. 14, 19 (2004) (“[I]n [Ashcroft II] the 
court affirmed a trial court’s preliminary enjoining of COPA’s enforcement and likely struck a 
fatal blow to a second congressional attempt to combat online pornography”).  The majority 
asserted: 
Filters are less restrictive than COPA.  They impose selective restrictions on speech at the 
receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source.  Under a filtering regime, adults 
without children may gain access to speech they have a right to see without having to 
identify themselves or provide their credit card information . . . Filters also may well be 
more effective than COPA. 
Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792. 
 23. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2795.  The Court implies that Congress should continue 
enacting statutes like COPA by stating, “On a final point, it is important to note that this opinion 
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Further, the Ashcroft II decision implies that the majority may believe that the 
government lacks a direct role in Internet regulation 24 and demonstrates the 
Supreme Court’s protectivism of the Internet as a medium for free, unfettered 
communication.25 
This author finds that filters are unequal to regulation by the government, 
which would require that publishers of pornographic websites utilize age 
verification systems, because filters require the public to take the initiative to 
turn on and use the filtering devices.26  Even if the government were to 
implement incentive programs encouraging parents’, schools’, and libraries’ 
use of filtering software, 27 filters do not block out as much Internet 
pornography, while simultaneously allowing innocuous speech, as would 
direct governmental regulation.28  As such, filters do not effectively combat the 
societal evil inherent in allowing minors unrestricted access to harmful, 
pornographic materials.29 
 
does not hold that Congress is incapable of enacting any regulation of the Internet designed to 
prevent minors from gaining access to harmful materials.”  Id. 
 24. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Justice Breyer concludes that a belief 
that the government has no direct role in regulating the Internet might have influenced the 
majority’s decision: “I recognize that some Members of the Court, now or in the past, have taken 
the view that the First Amendment simply does not permit Congress to legislate in this area.”  Id. 
 25. Erwin Chemerinsky, Unanswered Questions, 7 GREEN BAG 323, 333 (2003) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court is once again being protective of the internet as a medium for communication and 
restrictive as to the government’s ability to regulate it”).  See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 
868-69 (striking down the Communications Decency Act, a statute prohibiting transmission of 
obscene online communications to minors, as violating the First Amendment and distinguishing 
the Internet from other communications media). 
 26. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2793 (noting that inherent in a filtering system is “[t]he need 
for . . . cooperation” from the public). 
 27. Id. at 2793.  The majority suggests that “Congress can give strong incentives to schools 
and libraries to use [filters].”  Id. 
 28. Id. Even the majority acknowledges that “[f]iltering software . . . is not a perfect solution 
to the problem of children gaining access to harmful-to-minors materials” because filters “may 
block some materials that are not harmful to minors and fail to catch some that are.”  Id. 
 29. The focus of this article with regard to filtering systems is conceptual, grounded on a 
basic knowledge of filters’ functioning, rather than providing a technologically in-depth analysis.  
For a thorough report on protecting children from internet pornography, including extensive 
analyses of filtering technologies, see COMMITTEE TO STUDY TOOLS & STRATEGIES FOR 
PROTECTING KIDS FROM PORNOGRAPHY, COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMM. BOARD NAT’L RES. 
COUNCIL, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET 51 (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin 
eds., 2002) [hereinafter YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET].  The report explains 
generally how filters function: 
Filtering technologies allow Internet material or activities that are deemed inappropriate 
to be blocked, so that the individual using that filtered computer cannot gain access to that 
material or participate in those activities.  Typically, material is determined to be 
inappropriate on the basis of its source, its content, or the labels that have been associated 
with it.  Determination of inappropriate content can be accomplished by computer-based 
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The following section will describe the history behind the regulation of 
sexually explicit material and the litigation history of COPA preceding 
Ashcroft II.  Part III, the analysis, will analyze the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions of Ashcroft II.  Part IV, the author’s analysis, will explore 
the effects and implications of the Court’s holding in Ashcroft II. 
II.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE REGULATION OF SEXUALLY EXPLICIT 
MATERIALS 
Ashcroft II was not the first time the Supreme Court encountered 
legislation aimed at protecting children from inappropriate, harmful material.  
Indeed, on more than one occasion, Congress has attempted, through statutory 
enactments aimed at shielding minors from pornography, to carve out as 
unprotected by the First Amendment an area of expression based on its 
obscene content.30 
To meet First Amendment standards, the government must carefully tailor 
the scope of statutory enactments like COPA to the law’s goal, namely 
shielding minors from obscene online material, so as to ensure that speech is 
restricted no further than is necessary.31  Once enacted by Congress, each of 
these laws is inevitably challenged by groups with First Amendment 
concerns.32  The act trickles through the court system, ultimately reaching the 
Supreme Court whose decision and opinion ideally uphold the law as 
constitutional, thereby allowing the law to take effect, or give Congress 
valuable guidance as to why the law is or is not constitutional.  When a 
plaintiff challenges such a content-based speech restriction as overly broad, the 
 
methods, by a combination of computer-based methods and human judgment, or by 
human judgment alone. 
Id. 
 30. Susan Hanley Kosse, Try, Try Again: Will Congress Ever Get It Right? A Summary of 
Internet Pornography Laws Protecting Children and Possible Solutions, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 
721, 723 (2004) (listing recent congressional enactments pertaining to children and online 
pornography: Communications Decency Act of 1996, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 
Child Online Protection Act (1998), Child Internet Protection Act (2000), Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003). 
 31. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870-71, 874 (holding that in order to avoid violating 
First Amendment, the scope of a statute aimed at shielding children from online obscenities must 
not be ambiguous; statute must effectively address aim of legislation because substantial 
overbreadth of the statute indicates there exists a means of regulation less restrictive of free 
speech rights, means that do not suppress speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive, 
means that do not chill legitimate speech). 
 32. See Wilt, supra note 20, at 375 (describing the inevitable First Amendment challenges 
faced by an act that restricts speech, like COPA, faces: “[u]nsurprisingly, the availability of 
pornography on the Internet has led to extensive public criticism and, more importantly, to 
numerous legislative attempts to restrict, regulate, reduce, burden and ban it.  These endeavors 
have met with consistent and considerable opposition . . .”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] PLAYING HOT POTATO WITH COPA 483 
plaintiff must propose less restrictive alternatives to the statute. 33  To 
overcome this challenge of unconstitutionality, the government must prove that 
the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.34 
In deciding these difficult First Amendment censorship issues, the 
Supreme Court has developed a somewhat extensive precedential basis to 
which Congress looked in drafting COPA and the Court looked thereafter in 
deciding COPA’s fate in Ashcroft I and Ashcroft II.35  The following section 
outlines the precedent on government-regulated censorship of sexually explicit 
materials that came before Ashcroft II. 
An underlying issue in the following precedent is the Court’s debate over 
what level of scrutiny to apply in deciding the constitutionality of content-
based restrictions, like those imposed by COPA, on otherwise protected 
speech.  Theoretically, the Court employs a strict scrutiny standard in 
reviewing any such statue.36  A traditional strict scrutiny analysis requires that 
the content-based prohibition is 1) the least restrictive means of achieving the 
aim of the regulation, and 2) narrowly tailored to accomplishing the aim of the 
regulation so as not to chill otherwise legitimate speech.37  However, rather 
than automatically applying the strict scrutiny standard to the content-based 
restrictions discussed below, the Court has reduced the level of examination in 
consideration of the type of medium.38 
 
 33. When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the Government, in order to 
ensure that speech is restricted no further than is necessary to accomplish Congress’ goal, has the 
burden to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute. 
See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2790. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 2788. The majority acknowledges that Congress used the Court’s previous 
decisions in drafting COPA, noting that “Congress gave consideration to our earlier decisions on 
this subject . . . .”  Id. 
 36. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 
535-36 (1980). The Court explained what the analysis required: 
The Commission’s ban . . . is not, of course, invalid merely because it imposes a 
limitation upon speech. We must consider whether the State can demonstrate that its 
regulation is constitutionally permissible. The Commission’s arguments require us to 
consider three theories that might justify the state action. We must determine whether the 
prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, (ii) a permissible subject-
matter regulation, or (iii) a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state 
interest . . . A restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner of speech may be 
imposed so long as it is reasonable. But when regulation is based on the content of speech, 
governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has 
not been prohibited “merely because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.” 
Id. (citing Niemotko v. Md., 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951). 
 37. See Wilt, supra note 20, at 434 n.216 (describing the “traditional strict scrutiny 
formulation” as having two points of analysis 1) the “least restrictive alternative analysis,” and 2) 
whether the regulation is “narrowly tailored”). 
 38. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (finding content-based restrictions 
on the broadcasting medium do not merit strict scrutiny analysis). 
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A. Obscenity 
While the Supreme Court had decided in 1957 that materials defined as 
“obscene” were unprotected by the First Amendment and therefore able to be 
regulated by the government, 39 not until 1973, in Miller v. California, 
(“Miller”), did the Court define obscenity so that Congress and the states could 
effectively and constitutionally ban such material.  The Miller Court held that 
for a state law regulating obscenity to be constitutional, the law must have 
limited application to material which 1) “the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards’ would find . . ., taken as a whole, appeals 
to the prurient interest,” 2) “describes or depicts, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,” and 3) “taken 
as a whole, lacks serious, literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”40  The 
Court declared, “[w]e are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide 
fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial 
activities may bring prosecution.”41 A five- justice majority agreed that the 
obscenity definition was narrow enough to provide “concrete guidelines to 
isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from expression protected by the First 
Amendment.”42  Thus, the Miller test screens obscene and illegal pornography 
from the non-obscene and permissible pornography.43 
B. Child Pornography 
In New York v. Ferber, (“Ferber”), a case decided in 1982, the Supreme 
Court held that child pornography, like obscenity, is a distinct category of 
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.44  Because the law in question 
 
 39. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (“We hold that obscenity is not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech . . .”). 
 40. Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citing Kois v. Wis. 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). 
 41. Id. at 27. 
 42. Id. at 27, 29. 
 43. See, e.g., Wilt, supra note 20, at 382 (“Under the Miller test, some, but not all, 
pornography will be found to be obscene”). 
 44. N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (“When a definable class of material . . . bears 
so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, we think the 
balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permissible to consider these 
materials as without the protection of the First Amendment”). At issue in Ferber was a New York 
statute prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting a sexual performance by a child under the 
age of 16 by distributing material depicting such performance. Id. at 750. The court limited the 
definition of the kind of child pornography, which was unprotected by the First Amendment to 
“works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.” Id. at 764 
(explaining that “[t]here are, of course, limits on the category of child pornography which, like 
obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment . . . [a]s with all legislation in this sensitive 
area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law. . .” and 
that “[h]ere the nature of the harm to be combated requires that the state offense be limited to 
works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age”). 
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listed the forbidden acts with sufficient precision and adequately described that 
category of material the production and distribution of which was not entitled 
First Amendment protection, the Court found that the statute in question was 
constitutional.45  In so deciding, the Court expanded the area of sexually 
explicit material deemed unprotected by the First Amendment to cover child 
pornography as well as the obscenity that Miller found unprotected. 
C. Indecency 
Remaining still is sexually explicit speech that is not obscenity under the 
Miller definition or child pornography under the Ferber definition.  Although 
not technically “obscene,” this “indecent” material is also sexually explicit, but 
the Court has chosen not to completely remove all indecency from First 
Amendment protection as it did for obscenity and child pornography.  Thus 
far, the Court’s “indecency” decisions have been medium-specific: the level of 
protection afforded is dependent on the medium in question, such as radio, 
telephone, or cable television.46  The following cases provide an overview as to 
the Court’s analyses of indecency as communicated through various mediums 
other than the Internet. 
Decided in 1969, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications 
Commission was one of the first cases to suggest that the broadcasting medium 
receives different treatment than other types of expression under the First 
Amendment.47 The Court based its decision not to utilize a strict scrutiny 
analysis and to reduce First Amendment protections for broadcasting on the 
fact that radio frequencies are inherently limited in number.48  This scarcity, 
the Court reasoned, allows the government to regulate radio stations in ways 
that the First Amendment otherwise disallows regulation of other forms of 
expression, such as written or spoken communications.49 
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica, a 1978 case,50 the 
Court found that 1) the “pervasive presence” of the broadcasting media gave a 
 
 45. Id. at 765-66. 
 46. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (“We have long recognized that each medium of expression 
presents special First Amendment problems”). 
 47. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (explaining that “[a]lthough 
broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by First Amendment interest, differences in the 
characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to 
them”) (citation omitted). 
 48. Id. at 388 (“Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than 
there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to 
broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish”).  Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726, 729. The facts of the case revolved around a provocative radio 
show broadcast at two o’clock in the afternoon about which the Federal Communications 
Commission, (“FCC”), had received a complaint from a father whose young son heard the 
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listener the right to be free from potentially offensive material “presented over 
the airwaves” that “confronts the citizen not only in public, but also in the 
privacy of the home,” and 2) the way in which radio is available to children, 
“even those too young to read,” allows the broadcasting media to be 
regulated.51  In fact, the Court recognized that “of all forms of communication, 
it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment 
protection.”52  Thus, the Court found that the government may regulate 
broadcasting more than other communication media.53 
Sable Communications of California Inc. v. FCC, (“Sable”), a 1989 case, 
addressed a statute prohibiting the use of telephones as a means of providing 
“indecent” or “obscene” communications for commercial purposes.54  Under 
the Miller test, the Sable Court found that the statute was valid with respect to 
its obscenity prohibition.55  However, the Court, choosing to apply a strict 
scrutiny analysis, concluded that the statute’s restrictions on indecency were 
unconstitutional.  The Court found that a total prohibition on indecency was 
not narrowly tailored and would, in effect, chill otherwise protected speech.56  
Further, the Court held that the total ban on indecency in Sable was 
unconstitutionally overbroad because the government did not prove that less 
restrictive alternatives would be ineffective.57  The Court differentiated 
telephones from indecent broadcasting which requires a less-than-strict-
scrutiny analysis.  Radios, the Court held, are more pervasive because once a 
radio is turned on, the listener hears any offensive material that may be 
broadcast, whereas one can avoid the material at issue in Sable by simply 
 
broadcast. Id.  The Court addressed the issue of whether Congress could constitutionally regulate 
indecent speech in broadcasting. Id. 
 51. Id. at 748-49. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750-51. 
 54. Sable, 492 U.S. at 117 (stating, “The issue before us is the constitutionality of §223(b) of 
the Communications Act of 1934.  The statute . . . imposes an outright ban on indecent as well as 
obscene interstate commercial telephone messages”).  Id. The particular telephone service in 
question operated as follows: upon calling an adult message number and being billed, callers were 
able to hear “sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages.” Id. at 117-18. 
 55. Id. at 124-25 (explaining that because the statute applied the ‘“contemporary community 
standards’ requirement” upheld in Miller as a standard for obscenity, “there is no constitutional 
stricture against Congress’ prohibiting the interstate transmission of commercial telephone 
recordings”). 
 56. Id. at 131 (holding that the statute “is not a narrowly tailored effort to serve the 
compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to indecent telephone messages”). 
 57. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131 (finding that the statute, “in its present form, has the invalid effect 
of limiting the content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to 
hear” and, as such, the statute “is another case of ‘burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.’” (quoting 
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). 
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choosing not to call the telephone service in question. 58  Thus, stringently 
applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court strikes down regulations 
prohibiting indecent telephone services. 
In 1996, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, 
Inc. v. FCC, (“Denver Area”), the Court decided the constitutionality of three 
provisions of a statute aimed at reducing children’s exposure to indecent 
material on cable television.59  The Court refused to create a single standard of 
scrutiny that would apply to all future media cases and utilized a more flexible 
strict scrutiny approach that involved balancing the importance of the problem 
addressed by the statute against the level of restriction the statute imposed on 
speech.60 
However, in 2000, the Court in United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group, Inc., (“Playboy”), did not use the “flexible” strict scrutiny test of 
Denver Area, but rather clearly established that strict scrutiny was required for 
content-based regulation of cable.61  Noting the essential difference between 
cable and broadcasting, the Court stated, “Cable systems have the capacity to 
block unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis.”62  The Court 
held that because less restrictive means were available, namely a system 
requiring cable operators to completely block offensive material for patrons 
 
 58. Id. at 127-28 (“In an emphatically narrow holding, the Pacifica Court concluded that 
special treatment of indecent broadcasting was justified” because “it did not involve a total ban on 
broadcasting indecent material” and the Court “relied on the unique attributes of broadcasting . . . 
[that] can intrude on the privacy of the home without prior warning as to program content”). 
 59. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 727 (1996). 
 60. Id. at 743-44. (“The First Amendment interests involved . . . require a balance between 
those interests served by the access requirements themselves (increasing the availability of 
avenues of expression to programmers who otherwise would not have them) and the disadvantage 
to the First Amendment interests of cable operators and other programmers (those to whom the 
cable operator would have assigned the channels devoted to access)”) (citations omitted). 
Utilizing the balancing strict scrutiny test, the Denver Court found only one provision 
constitutional.  That provision authorized cable operators to choose not to show indecent 
materials and provided operators with flexibility to choose how to respond to the needs of their 
children and unconsenting adult audience. The other two, unconstitutional provisions, required 
operators to confine all indecency to one channel that subscribers could access only after written 
request to the operator for access to that channel. Id. at 733. 
 61. U.S. v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“Since [the statute] is a 
content-based speech restriction, it can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny”). In Playboy, a 
supplier of adult programming and owner of adult networks, sought a permanent injunction 
against the Telecommunications Act of 1996, requiring cable operators to either completely 
scramble a sexually explicit channel so that nonpaying customers would not experience “signal 
bleed,” where “either or both audio or visual portions of scrambled programs might be heard or 
seen” by nonpaying customers, or to restrict operating hours of such a channel. Id. at 807-08. 
 62. Id. at 815. 
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requesting such blocking rather than requiring operators to scramble all 
sexually explicit channels, the statute failed strict scrutiny.63 
Thus, the precedent on content-based indecency restrictions demonstrates 
that the Court, in consideration of the type of medium involved, does not 
automatically apply strict scrutiny.64  Because the pervasiveness of radio 
broadcasting takes away listeners’ freedom to choose whether or not to hear 
offensive material, the Court reduces the level of scrutiny so as to allow the 
government to regulate the radio.65  However, because telephone services and 
cable television provide patrons with the choice of whether to access such 
material, the Court applies strict scrutiny in an effort to protect such 
communications from government regulation.66  It is against this precedential 
backdrop that indecency regulation of a new medium, the Internet, came to the 
Court. 
D. The Communications Decency Act 
Passed during the tremendous spread of the Internet during the 1990s, the 
Communications Decency Act, (“CDA”), addressed Congress’ concerns with 
the increasing availability of online pornography to children by creating 
penalties for the offense of “indecency,” the sending of offensive material over 
the internet.67  CDA’s penalties were limited by two affirmative defenses: 1) 
 
 63. Id. at 823 (“There is no evidence that a well-promoted voluntary blocking provision 
would not be capable at least of informing parents about signal bleed (if they are not yet aware of 
it) and about their rights to have the bleed blocked (if they considered it a problem and have not 
yet controlled it themselves)”). 
 64. See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (finding content-based restrictions on the 
broadcasting medium do not merit strict scrutiny analysis); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (holding that 
the cable television medium, as opposed to the broadcasting medium, requires strict scrutiny). 
 65. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. The Court found that 1) the “pervasive presence” of the 
broadcasting media gave a listener the right to be free from potentially offensive material 
“presented over the airwaves” that “confronts the citizen not only in public, but also in the 
privacy of the home,” and 2) the way in which radio is available to children, “even those too 
young to read,” allows the broadcasting media to be regulated more.  In fact, the court recognized 
that “of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First 
Amendment protection.”  Id. 
 66. Sable, 492 U.S. at 131 (applying the strict scrutiny standard, the Court struck down 
regulations prohibiting indecent telephone service); Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (utilizing strict 
scrutiny when evaluating cable regulation). 
 67. Wilt, supra note 20, at 376 (“With the tremendous growth and spread of the Internet 
during the 1990s came an unprecedented accessibility to pornography and other sexually explicit 
material.  Concerned about the increasing availability of such materials to children . . .  Congress 
passed the CDA, which criminalized the transmission or display, via any telecommunications 
device or interactive computer service, of any indecent material to any person under the age of 
eighteen”).  Recall that indecency remains protected speech; it is neither obscene nor child 
pornography, materials that the Court has said are unprotected and can therefore be regulated by 
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protecting those who had taken “in good faith, reasonable, effective, and 
appropriate actions under the circumstances” to shield children from harmful 
material, 68 and 2) covering those who restricted access by requiring proof of 
age such as credit card or an adult identification numbers.69 
In 1997, in the case of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, (“Reno”), 
the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional CDA’s provisions enacted 
to protect children from “indecent” and “patently offensive” Internet material, 
terms that CDA did not define, thereby rendering the act overly broad and in 
violation of the First Amendment rights of adults.70  While CDA provided that 
“patently offensive” materials were to be determined by “contemporary 
community standards,” a standard that the Miller Court had upheld as 
constitutional in defining obscenity, the statute lacked the qualifications and 
limitations possessed by the Miller definition.71 
The Court utilized a strict scrutiny approach.  In choosing to apply “the 
most stringent review” of CDA, the Reno Court pointed out the importance of 
the Internet as a new, immensely wide-ranging medium that, unlike radio or 
television, is less invasive because communications over the Internet do not 
appear on an individual’s computer unbidden.72  Further, CDA differed from 
statutes that had come before the Court earlier where the Court had upheld 
content-based restrictions of sexually explicit material because CDA 1) did not 
allow parents the option of consenting to their children’s exposure to restricted 
materials, 2) was punitive, and 3) was not limited to commercial transactions.73  
Having failed on their first attempt to regulate children’s exposure to explicit 
 
the government, and the Court has routinely applied a strict scrutiny standard to indecency.  See 
discussion supra pp. 9-13. 
 68. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (2003). 
 69. Id. at § 223(e)(5)(B). 
 70. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 875.  The Court held: 
It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting 
children from harmful materials. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad 
suppression of speech addressed to adults . . . [t]he Government may not “reduc[e] the 
adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. at 873 (finding that CDA lacks two limitations of the Miller test: 1) “that the 
proscribed material be ‘specifically defined by applicable state law,’” a requirement that “reduces 
the vagueness inherent in the open-ended term ‘patently offensive’ as used in the CDA,” and 2) 
that the Miller definition was “limited to ‘sexual conduct,’” as opposed to the CDA which 
includes non-sexual conduct such as “excretory activities”). 
 72. Id. at 868-69 (relaying the findings of the district court that “communications over the 
Internet do not invade an individuals home or appear on one’s computer unbidden” and that it is 
“seldom [that one] encounter[s] content by accident”). 
 73. Id. at 864-69. 
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Internet material, Congress went back to the drawing board to draft COPA 
with the holding of the Reno Court in mind.74 
E. The Child Online Protection Act 
While COPA shares CDA’s primary aim, the prohibition on the 
transmission of certain indecent materials by imposing criminal and civil 
sanctions for such activity, Congress modified COPA in accordance with the 
Reno Court’s criticisms of CDA.75  Congress limited the scope of COPA: 1) 
COPA applies only to commercial materials;76 2) COPA applies only to 
materials on the World Wide Web,77 not to the Internet outside the World 
Wide Web such as e-mails and chat rooms to which it is impossible to restrict 
minors’ access;78 and 3) COPA changes CDA’s vague “indecent” and 
“patently offensive” standard to a “harmful to minors” standard which is 
clarified by a three prong test that further defines what materials are harmful to 
minors.79 
 
 74. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788 (“[I]n enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to 
our earlier decisions . . . in particular the decision in Reno . . . For that reason, ‘the Judiciary must 
proceed with caution and . . . with care before invalidating the Act’”) (quoting Ashcroft I, 535 
U.S. 564, 592). 
 75. Id. 
 76. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2003) (“Whoever . . . makes any communication for commercial 
purposes . . .”). Congress narrowed COPA’s scope in this respect in response to the Court’s 
findings in Reno. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 865 (noting that the CDA differs from other statutes 
upheld in that it was not limited to commercial transactions). 
 77. § 231(a)(1) (“Whoever . . . by means of the World Wide Web, makes any 
communication . . .”). 
 78. COPA narrowed its scope in this respect in response to the Court’s findings in Reno.  See 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 855-56 (finding that that “there is no effective way to determine the 
identity or the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail . . . newsgroups or chat 
rooms”). 
 79. § 231(a)(1) (“Whoever . . . makes any communication . . . that includes material that is 
harmful to minors . . .”); Kosse, supra note 30, at 730 (noting that COPA “was noticeably 
narrower than the CDA . . . the standard was changed from the [CDA’s] ambiguous, indecent and 
patently offensive standard to a harmful to minors standard”). Under COPA’s three prong test to 
determine whether liability will attach and to identify whether material is “harmful to minors,” it 
must be proven that: 
1. the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking 
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is 
designed to pander to, the prurient interest; 
2. depicts, describes or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to 
minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated 
normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent 
female breast; and 
3. taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for 
minors. 
§ 231(e)(6)(A)-(C). 
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One day following its enactment, the ACLU brought suit to challenge 
COPA.80  Since its enactment, injunctions have prevented COPA from taking 
effect.81 
F. Ashcroft I 
In Ashcroft I, the Court upheld COPA’s use of “contemporary community 
standards” to identify harmful-to-minors material, finding that the use of that 
standard alone did not render the act overbroad.82  The Court in Ashcroft I 
specifically limited the scope of its decision to the issue of COPA’s use of 
community standards, choosing not to address whether COPA was 
substantially overbroad for other reasons or unconstitutionally vague.83  The 
Court, in an 8-1 decision, vacated the lower court’s ruling and remanded the 
case to the court of appeals to reconsider whether the district court had been 
correct to grant the preliminary injunction.84 
III.  ANALYSIS OF ASHCROFT II 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari again and in June 2004 ruled against 
the government in Ashcroft II by a 5-4 margin.85  Justice Kennedy wrote the 
majority opinion, joined by Justices Souter and Thomas with whom Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred.86  The majority applied a strict 
 
 80. Kosse, supra note 30, at 730-31 (stating that “[t]he day after COPA became effective, 
the ACLU filed suit claiming that the statute violated the First and Fifth Amendments because it 
was vague and infringed upon the protected speech of adults”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 584-85. The plaintiffs argued that the use of community standards 
rendered COPA overbroad because it would “require Web publishers to shield some material 
behind age verification screens that could be displayed openly in many communities across the 
Nation if Web speakers were able to limit access to their sites on a geographic basis.”  The Court 
found that COPA’s reliance on community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors 
does not by itself render the statute substantially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment. 
Unlike the CDA’s use of the contemporary community standard, the Court explained, COPA’s 
scope is narrower, applying to a limited amount of material, namely only commercial 
communications on the World Wide Web, and defining the harmful-to-minors standard in a 
manner similar to that upheld in Miller.  Id. 
 83. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2790 (stating that the Ashcroft I Court “emphasized . . . that 
[the] decision was limited to that narrow issue” of whether the community-standards language 
made COPA unconstitutional). 
 84. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 564, 586. For a brief overview of legislation passed since 1996 
related to shielding children from sexually explicit materials found on the Internet, see the chart 
formulated by Susan Hanley Kosse in her article that summarizes Internet pornography laws 
aimed at protecting children.  The chart chronologically depicts the legislation and litigation 
related to Internet regulation. Kosse, supra note 30, at 724. 
 85. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2787, 2795. 
 86. Id. at 2787. 
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scrutiny analysis.87  The issue decided by the court was whether the federal 
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction was correct.88  The Court 
upheld the injunction, explaining that there was a substantial likelihood that the 
plaintiffs would prevail on their argument that COPA does not meet strict 
scrutiny because less restrictive alternatives, namely filters, exist.89  Justice 
Breyer dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor.  
Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent.90  In this interlocutory decision, the 
Court simply refused to lift a court order stopping enforcement of the 
provisions of COPA and did not decide COPA’s constitutionality, remanding 
the case on that issue back to the Third Circuit.91 
A. Majority Opinion 
The majority began by explaining the focus of its analysis, the 
interlocutory matter of whether the lower court’s decision to grant the 
injunction was proper.92  With this narrow focus delineated, the majority 
expressly declined to consider the correctness of the other arguments that the 
court of appeals relied upon in affirming the injunction, namely the court of 
appeal’s consideration of the constitutionality of COPA’s terms.93  The Court 
 
 87. Id. at 2791 (stating the applicable standard of scrutiny used for content-based speech 
restrictions is whether “‘less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the 
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve’”) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at  
874).  See also Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[T]he [Ashcroft II] case is notable because 
the Court used strict scrutiny in evaluating government regulation of sexual speech”). 
 88. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788 (explaining that they “must decide whether the Court of 
Appeals was correct to affirm a ruling by the District Court that the enforcement of COPA should 
be enjoined because the statute likely violates the First Amendment”). 
 89. Id. at 2795 (holding that “the Government has not shown that the less restrictive 
alternatives proposed by respondents should be disregarded” and that “[t]hose alternatives, 
indeed, may be more effective than the provisions of COPA” and, therefore, “[t]he District Court 
did not abuse its discretion when it entered the preliminary injunction”).  The court also gave 
procedural reasons for upholding the injunction and remanding the case for a fully trial on the 
merits: 
First, the potential harms from reversing the injunction outweigh those of leaving it in 
place by mistake . . . Second, there are substantial factual disputes in the case . . . 
Third . . . the factual record does not reflect current technological reality—a serious flaw 
in any case involving the Internet. 
Id. at 2794. 
 90. Id. at 2787. 
 91. Id. at 2795. 
 92. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788 (explaining Ashcroft II’s procedural history: “This case 
comes to the Court on certiorari review of an appeal from the decision of the District Court 
granting a preliminary injunction.  The Court of Appeals reviewed the decision of the District 
Court for abuse of discretion.  Under that standard, the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion . . .”). 
 93. Id. at 2791 (“We agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in entering the preliminary injunction” but “our reasoning . . . is based on a narrower, 
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concentrated primarily on the issues addressed by the district court: the 
plaintiff’s contention that there existed less restrictive alternatives to COPA 
and whether the government met its burden of proving that the plaintiff’s 
proposed alternatives would not be as effective as the challenged statute.94  The 
majority provided two main analyses 1) the less-restrictive-alternative analysis, 
and 2) procedural reasons for remanding the case.95 
First, the majority found that filters are less restrictive than COPA because 
filters “impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end not 
universal restrictions at the source” as are imposed by COPA’s requirement 
that users identify themselves before allowing access to material.96  A “filtering 
regime” allows adults, by simply turning the filter off, to access speech that 
they have a right to see without having to comply with COPA regulations, such 
as providing credit card information or identifying themselves.97  Whereas 
COPA condemns as criminal a certain category of speech and requires website 
publishers to use age-verification systems at the source of the speech, (“source 
regulation”), a filtering regime condemns no speech, blocking certain speech 
when triggered to do so by key words found in a received communication, 
(“end regulation”), and thereby creates no chilling effect on speech.98 Thus, the 
majority found that filters are less restrictive.99 
Moving on, the majority determined that filters may be more effective in 
censoring sexually explicit material because filters block objectionable content 
regardless of where it originates, whereas COPA blocks only content posted on 
the United State’s World Wide Web.100  Further, because filters can apply to 
other means of Internet communication, like e-mail, filters are more effective 
than COPA, which applies only to websites on the World Wide Web.101  Thus, 
under COPA, children can still access harmful Internet material originating in 
foreign countries, material that filters can block.102  Internet providers can 
elude COPA’s restraints easily by moving their operations to foreign 
locations.103  Additionally, the age-verification systems required by COPA, the 
majority stated, “may be subject to evasion and circumvention, for example by 
 
more specific grounds than the rationale of the Court of Appeals . . . none of [the Court of 
Appeal’s] constructions of statutory terminology . . . were relied on by or necessary to the 
conclusions of the District Court[,]” and thus, “we decline to consider the correctness of the other 
arguments relied on by the Court of Appeals”). 
 94. Id. at 2792. 
 95. See id. at 2783-2795. 
 96. Id. at 2792. 
 97. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792. 
 103. See id. 
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minors who have their own credit cards.”104  Thus, COPA failed to pass strict 
scrutiny: not only are filters less restrictive, but the government also failed to 
demonstrate that COPA is more effective, that it reaches more pornographic 
materials that are harmful to minors, than the proposed less restrictive 
alternative, namely filters.105 
The majority then addressed two of the government’s arguments against 
filters as reasonable alternatives to COPA.  The majority conceded that filters 
might block some non-harmful materials and allow access to some harmful 
materials.106  But irrespective of this possibility, the majority found that the 
government failed to disprove that overall filters were less effective than 
COPA’s “source regulation.”107  Practically, the majority reasoned, remanding 
the case for a full trial would allow for presentation of new evidence on this 
point, new evidence regarding the effectiveness of current filtering 
technology.108  Then, responding to the government’s argument that filters are 
not an acceptable alternative because Congress cannot require their use, the 
majority held that congressionally enacted incentive programs could encourage 
the use of filters in schools and libraries.109  The majority continued, holding 
that the need for voluntary parental use of filters did not automatically 
disqualify filters as an available alternative because a court should not presume 
that parents, given complete information, would fail to use filters.110  Thus, the 
Court concluded, filters are an effective alternative because “[b]y enacting 
programs to promote use of filtering software, Congress could give parents 
[the] ability [to monitor what their children access online] without subjecting 
protected speech to severe penalties.”111 
Moving on to its second reason for affirming the district court’s imposition 
of a preliminary injunction, the majority provided four practical reasons for 
letting the injunction stand pending a full trial on the merits.112  First, the 
majority noted that “the potential harms from reversing the injunction 
outweigh[ed] those of leaving it in place”—the harm in allowing COPA to take 
effect at the risk of chilling protected speech outweighed the harm of allowing 
the injunction to stand and postponing COPA’s imposition of criminal 
sanctions for a decision on the merits.113  Second, because substantial factual 
disputes remained in the case, allowing the preliminary injunction to stand and 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  at 2792-93. 
 106. Id. at 2793. 
 107. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2793. 
 108. Id. at 2794. 
 109. Id. at 2793 (citing United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)). 
 110. Id. (citing Playboy, 529 U.S. at 824). 
 111. Id. at 2793. 
 112. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2794. 
 113. Id. 
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remanding for trial forced the government to “shoulder its full constitutional 
burden of proof respecting the less restrictive alternative argument, rather than 
excus[ing] it from doing so.”114  Third, the majority reasoned that because the 
factual record lacked updated technological information, a necessity in Internet 
litigation, and contained only the five-year-old information used at the district 
court level affirming the injunction, remanding for trial would allow the parties 
to update and supplement the record with current technological findings.115  
Finally, because of the court of appeal’s focus on COPA’s definitions as 
rendering it unconstitutional, the court found that the parties had thus far been 
unable to devote their attentions to proving the question of the relative 
restrictiveness and effectiveness of COPA’s alternatives and remanding the 
case would give the parties an opportunity to do so.116 
B. Concurring Opinion 
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, agreed with the 
majority’s less-restrictive-means analysis and gave a concurring opinion so as 
to “underscore just how restrictive COPA is.”117  Justice Stevens found 
COPA’s imposition of criminal prosecutions as a means of regulating obscene 
materials was inappropriate in light of the vagueness inherent in any standard 
of obscenity or indecency.118  Justice Stevens also noted that the interest in 
protecting minors from viewing sexually explicit material may not warrant the 
gravity of the criminal burdens imposed by COPA.119 
C. Dissenting Opinions 
Justice Breyer, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor 
joined, argued that Congress could not protect children from exposure to 
online commercial pornography in another manner that was less restrictive 
than COPA.120  Justice Breyer examined 1) the burdens imposed by COPA, 2) 
COPA’s ability to further a compelling interest, and 3) the proposed less 
restrictive alternatives.121 
Justice Breyer first argued that COPA limits its definition of regulated 
material, harmful-to-minors material, to the definition of obscenity upheld in 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 2794-95. 
 116. Id. at 2795. 
 117. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2795-96 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. (“Criminal prosecutions are . . . an inappropriate means to regulate the universe of 
materials classified as ‘obscene,’ since ‘the line between communications which ‘offend’ and 
those which do not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct’” (quoting Smith v. United States, 
431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977)). 
 119. Id. at 2796-97. 
 120. Id. at 2787, 2798 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 2798. 
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Miller.122  The Miller definition held that material is obscene as to adults if it 
“appeals to the prurient interest;” depicts sexual conduct in a “patently 
offensive way;” and, “taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political 
or scientific value.”123  By adding to Miller’s definition, which would 
otherwise cover only obscenity, the words “with respect to minors”124 and “for 
minors,”125 COPA “only slightly” expands Miller’s obscenity definition to 
cover harmful-to-minors material, specifically indecent material that 
specifically “seek[s] a sexual response from” minors.126  Further, Justice 
Breyer pointed out that COPA “does not censor the material it covers,” merely 
requiring providers of harmful-to-minors material to screen those wishing to 
access the site, a requirement that would impose little monetary costs to web 
site owners.127  Additionally, the risk of embarrassment to users who might be 
required to provide age-verification information to access a site does not 
automatically violate the Constitution.128  Justice Breyer concluded that COPA 
“at most imposes a modest additional burden on adult access to legally obscene 
material, perhaps imposing a similar burden on access to some protected 
borderline obscene material as well.”129 Thus, Justice Breyer found that the 
First Amendment permits an alternative holding than that of the majority.  
Construing COPA narrowly, allows reconciliation between COPA’s language 
and the requirements of the First Amendment.130 
 
 122. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 123. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
 124. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6)(A) (stating the first prong of the three prong test as to what 
material is harmful to minors; defining material that is harmful to minors as that which “the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the material as a 
whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the 
prurient interest”). 
 125. § 231(e)(6)(C) (giving the third prong of the test as to what material is harmful to 
minors; defining material that is harmful to minors as that which “taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors”). 
 126. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that minors 
are defined as “some group of adolescents or post-adolescents.”  Id.  See also, id. at 2800 (“In 
sum, the Act’s definitions limit the statute’s scope to commercial pornography” and “[i]t affects 
unprotected obscene material,” as defined in Miller.  Thus, “[g]iven the inevitable uncertainty 
about how to characterize close-to-obscene material, [COPA] could apply to (or chill the 
production of) [only] a limited class of borderline material that courts might ultimately find is 
protected”). 
 127. Id. at 2800-01 (stating that “[a]ccording to the trade association for the commercial 
pornographers who are the statute’s target, use of such verification procedures is ‘standard 
practice’ in their online operations”). 
 128. Id. at 2801. (“‘[T]he Constitution does not guarantee the right to acquire information at a 
public library without any risk of embarrassment’”) (quoting American Library, 539 U.S. at 209 
(plurality opinion)). 
 129. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2801 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 2805. 
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Turning to the question of whether COPA furthered a compelling interest, 
Justice Breyer found that COPA significantly furthers COPA’s aim of 
protecting minors from exposure to commercial pornography 131 because no 
alternative to COPA exists that furthers COPA’s goal as effectively.  Justice 
Breyer found that filters are not an alternative legislative approach to shielding 
children from online pornography.132  In fact, the availability of filters 
constituted part of the problem, the “status quo,” to which Congress responded 
by enacting COPA.133  Thus, in finding filters less restrictive than COPA, the 
majority has essentially affirmed the status quo which, “by definition, . . . is 
less restrictive than [any] new regulatory law” that goes beyond the status 
quo.134  The relevant inquiry, Justice Breyer then found, was whether the status 
quo, inclusive of filters, addressed the compelling interest and whether COPA 
helped further that interest more than the filter-inclusive status quo.135  Justice 
Breyer concluded that COPA’s age-verification requirements furthered the 
compelling interest more than filtering because filters possess insufficiencies 
that propelled Congress to enact COPA: 1) filtering allows some harmful 
material to pass through unhindered; 2) filtering software costs money for 
families to install; 3) filtering depends on parents deciding and enforcing at 
which computer their children will use the Internet; 4) filtering blocks much 
valuable, innocuous material.136 
Justice Breyer then discussed the less restrictive alternative offered by the 
majority.137 Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that government 
encouragement of filter usage could be effective if the government designated 
a vast amount of resources to giving parents and schools filters and training 
them on how to use filters effectively.138  But, Justice Breyer noted, such an 
expansive governmental program is extreme and expensive139 and “‘a judge 
would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little 
less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby 
enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.’”140  Thus, Justice Breyer 
 
 131. Id. at 2801 (citing Denver, 518 U.S. at 743 (“interest in protecting minors is 
‘compelling’”)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2801-02. 
 134. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2801-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 2802. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 2804 (stating, “I turn, then, to the actual ‘less restrictive alternatives’ that the Court 
proposes.  The Court proposes two real alternatives, i.e. two potentially less restrictive ways in 
which Congress might alter the status quo in order to achieve its ‘compelling’ objective”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2804 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 140. Id. at 2804 (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 
188-89 (1979) (concurring opinion)). 
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found that incentive programs encouraging filter usage were not a reasonable 
alternative to COPA. 
In conclusion, Justice Breyer suggested that the Court’s holding presented 
two more issues.141  First, the issue that the Ashcroft II Court again failed to 
decide COPA’s fate, and remanded the issue yet again to the district court 
“[a]fter eight years of legislative effort, two statutes, and [more than one] 
Supreme Court case . . . .”142  Justice Breyer reminded the majority that 
Congress, in passing COPA, adhered to the Court’s specific directives in Reno 
concerning the characteristics of a statute that would successfully protect 
children from exposure to online pornography while also protecting adults’ 
constitutional rights to access such material.143  Because COPA successfully 
adhered to the Court’s directive in Reno and the Ashcroft II majority has 
nonetheless held that COPA did not pass strict scrutiny, Justice Breyer 
concluded that members of the Court might believe that the First Amendment 
does not allow Congress to regulate the area of internet expression that COPA 
addresses.144  If such is the case, Justice Breyer argued, then the Court should 
“say so clearly” because holding that the act fails on less-restrictive-alternative 
grounds and remanding the case once again seems to “promise” Congress 
“legislative leeway” that might not exist if the majority believes that the 
government has no role in internet regulation.145 
Finally, Justice Breyer suggested that the majority’s holding, which rested 
on a less-restrictive-means analysis, was ambiguous.146  The majority’s holding 
did not answer the question of whether striking down COPA would amount to 
more or less protection of speech.147  Justice Breyer explained that the 
majority’s decision reduced the government’s options to either “ban totally,” 
which suppresses legitimate speech as well as indecent speech, or “do nothing 
at all,” which allows unprotected, obscene speech to circulate freely.148  
Whereas, COPA, Justice Breyer elaborated, provided a “middle way:” rather 
than prosecuting all obscenity to the maximum extent possible or doing 
nothing at all, the government could, through COPA, insist that commercial 
publishers of Internet pornography provide age verification screens on their 
sites and, only if they fail to do so, prosecute them.149 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2804-05. 
 143. Id. at 2805. 
 144. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I recognize that some Members 
of the Court, now or in the past, have taken the view that the First Amendment simply does not 
permit Congress to legislate this area”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2806 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Breyer in finding 
that COPA was constitutional.  Justice Scalia, however, took issue with the fact 
that both the majority opinion and Justice Breyer’s dissent utilized a strict 
scrutiny analysis when a less exacting standard was appropriate for 
commercial pornography because, Justice Scalia found, such materials are 
unprotected speech.150 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS OF ASHCROFT II 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of COPA in Ashcroft II, deciding the case 
on an interlocutory matter rather than addressing the constitutional issue, has 
significant bearing on COPA’s future.  An analysis of the circumstances 
surrounding and possible motivations behind the Court’s decision proves a 
fruitful analysis in terms of predicting the fate of COPA and Internet regulation 
as a whole. 
Generally, the October Term of 2003, in which the Court decided Ashcroft 
II, was a fairly typical representation of recent Supreme Court terms.151  The 
Court decided the exact same number of cases that it did the year before and, 
of those decisions, roughly the same proportion were 5-4 decisions.152  
Notably, the Ashcroft II decision veers from the Supreme Court’s usual 
practice and the other decisions of the October Term of 2003 in two respects. 
First, the 5-4 opinion in Ashcroft II does not follow the customary pattern.  
The Ashcroft II decision was written by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, with whom Justices Breyer, 
O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia dissented.153  This differs from the usual 
 
[COPA] tells the Government that, instead of prosecuting bans on obscenity to the 
maximum extent possible . . . it can insist that those who make available material that is 
obscene or close to obscene keep that material under wraps, making it readily available to 
adults who wish to see it, while restricting access to children.  By providing this third 
option—a “middle way”—[COPA] avoids the need for potentially speech-suppressing 
prosecutions. 
Id. 
 150. Id. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Nothing in the First Amendment entitles the type of material covered by COPA to that 
exacting standard of review. “We have recognized that commercial entities which engage 
in the sordid business of pandering by deliberately emphasizing the sexually provocative 
aspects of [their nonobscene products] in order to catch the salaciously disposed, engage 
in constitutionally unprotected behavior.”  There is no doubt that the commercial 
pornography covered by COPA fits this description. 
Id. (quoting Playboy, 529 U.S. at 831 (Scalia J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 151. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 323 (analyzing some of the significant decisions of the 
October 2003 term). 
 152. Id. (stating that the Court decided the same number of cases in the previous term as it did 
in the October 2003 term in which the Court decided 73 cases after briefing and oral argument, 21 
of which were 5-4 decisions). 
 153. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2787. 
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composition of the majority in 5-4 decisions: Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.154  The Ashcroft II majority does not even 
follow the second most common majority in 5-4 decisions: Justice Stevens, 
O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.155  This anomaly in the Justices’ 
usual voting patterns indicates that there is likely some issue in Ashcroft II that 
distinguishes it from the typical Supreme Court case. 
Second, also inconsistent with past practice, the Ashcroft II Court left open 
the issue of COPA’s constitutionality.156  The Supreme Court decided the 
relatively simple interlocutory matter and remanded the merits to the lower 
court.  Rather than following usual practice of deciding the merits 
simultaneously with procedural issues, the Court opted to wait for COPA to 
return again. 157  This break from usual Supreme Court practice ignited 
speculation that the Court might have particular concerns with the issues 
involved in Ashcroft II. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court treated COPA differently, breaking from past 
practice perhaps in response to some particular issues inherent in COPA and 
Ashcroft II.  The following analysis of the Ashcroft II decision discusses some 
of the reasons for and implications of the Supreme Court’s decision. 
A. Failing to Give Congress Guidance 
One of the most noteworthy aspects of Ashcroft II was the Court’s express 
decision to make no decision on the merits.  Although Ashcroft II was decided 
on June 29, 2004, the last day of the Supreme Court’s October 2003 term, 158  it 
is unlikely that the Court’s eagerness to finish the term explains their failure to 
give Congress concrete guidance regarding COPA’s constitutionality.  
Stopping short of reaching the merits, Ashcroft II is merely “a garden-variety 
 
 154. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 323 (stating that of the 21 5-4 decisions in the October 
2003 term, “[a]s always, the most common majority in the 5-4 rulings was comprised of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas”). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. 2783; Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 323-24.  Chemerinsky 
notes that the October 2003 term left unresolved many issues: “[T]he Court left open important 
questions by issuing only a narrow holding.”  Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 324.  See, e.g., 
Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (holding that a disabled person may sue state governments 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act but neglecting to address whether other suits may be 
brought against states under the act); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004) (holding 
that an individual may sue under the Alien Tort Claims Act but failing to clearly establish when 
suits will be allowed). 
 157. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. 2783; Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 324. (“I cannot think of 
any recent Supreme Court Term where so much was left undecided.  All of these issues will now 
be faced by the state courts and the lower federal courts.  Ultimately, almost all of these questions 
will return to the Supreme Court in the years ahead for further clarification”). 
 158. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. 2783; Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 323 (noting that the October 
Term 2003 ended on June 29, 2004, the day that Ashcroft II was decided). 
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interlocutory decision in which the court simply refused to lift a court order 
stopping enforcement of [COPA’s] provisions.”159  In doing so, the Court 
consciously passed up an opportunity to end the debate over COPA’s 
constitutionality, instead allowing the debate to continue slowly through the 
court system.160 
Three points illustrate the majority’s failure to give Congress clear 
directives.  First, the language of the Court’s opinion is indicative of the 
majority’s intentional indecisiveness on the issue, stating only that filters 
“may . . . be more effective than COPA.”161  While the Court acknowledges 
imperfections in filters, the majority is unwilling to concretely express its 
position as to whether such imperfections render filters less effective than 
COPA.162  Rather, the Court only states that the government has the burden of 
showing that filters are less effective, 163  a conclusion based on evidentiary 
matters and one that affords any interpretation as to the Court’s position other 
than as providing direct guidance as to the Court’s position on COPA’s 
constitutionality. 
Second, the Court expressly avoids giving its stance as to the effectiveness 
of filters by giving vague, procedural rationales for remanding the case.164  The 
Court states that remand will allow the parties to present updated evidence as 
to the effectiveness of filters because such information “might make a 
difference.”165  After many years of legislating and litigating COPA, Justice 
 
 159. Bernard James, First Amendment: What ‘Locke’ Portends, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 2, 2004 at 
S10 (reviewing First Amendment decisions of Supreme Court’s 2003-2004 term).  Bernard James 
is a professor of constitutional law at Pepperdine University School of Law.  Id. 
 160. Id. (arguing that as a result of the Court’s failure to decide COPA’s constitutionality, 
“the debate over its constitutionality crawls to trial”). 
 161. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792.  The Court, in its review of the evidence considered by the 
District Court in making the decision to grant the preliminary injunction, stated that filters “are 
less restrictive than COPA” and “may well be more effective than COPA.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. at 2793 (finding that filters “may block some materials that are not harmful to minors 
and fail to catch some that are”) (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. (“Whatever the deficiencies of filters . . . the Government failed to introduce specific 
evidence proving that existing technologies are less effective than the restrictions in COPA[,]” 
and, thus, “[i]n the absence of a showing as to the relative effectiveness of COPA and the 
alternatives proposed by respondents, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to 
grant the preliminary injunction”). 
 164. Id. at 2794. The majority explains “important practical reasons” for remanding the case: 
First, the potential harms from reversing the injunction outweigh those of leaving it in 
place by mistake . . . Second, there are substantial factual disputes in the case . . . 
Third . . . the factual record does not reflect current technological reality—a serious flaw 
in any case involving the Internet. 
Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2794. 
 165. Id. at 2795 (emphasis added) (noting that the evidence relied upon by the Court is that 
relied upon by the District Court which is five years old and “[b]y affirming the preliminary 
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Breyer, in his dissent, expresses confusion with the majority’s decision to 
remand the case for further proceedings.166  Justice Breyer begs the rhetorical 
question: 
What [further] proceedings [are needed]?  I have found no offer by either party 
to present more relevant evidence.  What remains to be litigated? I know the 
Court says that the parties may ‘introduce further evidence’ as to the ‘relative 
restrictiveness and effectiveness of alternatives to the statute.’ But I do not 
understand what that new evidence might consist of.167 
As such, the “important practical reasons” provided by the majority for its 
decision to remand were vague, leaving the government and Justice Breyer 
confused as to what other evidence the government must present. 
Finally, as noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent and acknowledged by the 
majority, Congress wrote COPA in response to the Court’s holding in Reno 
regarding content-based restrictions on Internet pornography.168  Justice Breyer 
states: 
Congress read Reno with care.  It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a 
statute that would meet each and every criticism of the predecessor statute[, the 
CDA,] that this Court set forth in Reno.  It incorporated language from the 
Court’s precedents, particularly the Miller standard, virtually verbatim.  And it 
created what it believed was a statute that would protect children from 
exposure to obscene professional pornography without obstructing adult access 
to material that the First Amendment protects.  What else is Congress 
supposed to do?169 
Unfortunately, Congress cannot look to the Ashcroft II decision to answer 
Justice Breyer’s question because the Ashcroft II Court failed to give Congress 
clear guidance as to how COPA failed the Reno Court’s directives, choosing 
instead to skirt the issue by deciding the case on grounds other than the merits. 
Although the majority stated that “Congress is [not] incapable of enacting 
any regulation of the Internet designed to prevent minors from gaining access 
to harmful materials,” 170 Ashcroft II basically sends Congress away without 
direction to attempt blindly to formulate an act that the Supreme Court may or 
may not validate.  Indeed, the Ashcroft II opinion does not offer many 
possibilities to Congress.  The Court, in deciding a mere interlocutory matter, 
 
injunction and remanding for trial, we allow the parties to update and supplement the factual 
record to reflect current technological realities”). 
 166. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 2805 (citation omitted). 
 168. Id. at 2788.  The majority states that “[i]n enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration 
to our earlier decisions on this subject, in particular the decision in Reno . . . .”  Ashcroft II, 124 
S.Ct. at 2788 (citation omitted).  See also id. at 2805 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting that 
“Congress passed [COPA] in response to the Court’s decision in Reno”). 
 169. Id. at 2805 (citations omitted). 
 170. Id. at 2795. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] PLAYING HOT POTATO WITH COPA 503 
simply contrasted end regulation against source regulation, finding end 
regulation might be a less restrictive alternative.171  Although the majority did 
give Congress one offhand suggestion, that Congress might enact incentives to 
encourage volitional filter usage,172 the Ashcroft II Court did not provide 
Congress with an in-depth explanation of this suggestion, any statutory 
interpretation of COPA, or any other guidance regarding what type of Internet 
regulation law might pass constitutional muster.173 
Contrary to the majority, the dissenting opinions suggest ways in which a 
more in-depth reading might, at least, give Congress more guidance and, at 
best, produce an entirely different result.  Justice Scalia suggested lowering the 
standard of scrutiny applied to COPA.174  Justice Breyer conducted a narrow 
reading of COPA.175  Conversely, the majority simply decided the matter on 
interlocutory grounds and neglected giving Congress any guidance other than 
that Congress still may be able to enact a constitutional statute that regulates 
the Internet.176 
Ashcroft II’s shallow, interlocutory decision was surely a disappointment 
to Congress.  Indeed, the majority failed to foreclose any possibilities: the 
Court may or may not find filters are a viable alternative to COPA; the Court 
may find new evidence that may or may not be presented on remand “make[s] 
a difference”177 as to COPA’s constitutionality; the Court may or may not find 
the government can sufficiently prove filters are ineffective; and the Court may 
or may not take into account that COPA is based on the Court’s directives in 
Reno.  The Ashcroft II decision leaves the government confused regarding the 
Court’s position on COPA and, more generally, “source” regulation designed 
to shield minors from online pornography.  Justice Breyer conjectures that 
 
 171. Id. (“On this record, the Government has not shown that the less restrictive alternatives 
proposed by respondents should be disregarded.  Those alternatives, indeed, may be more 
effective than the provisions of COPA”) (emphasis added). 
 172. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2793 (stating that Congress can “take steps to promote [the] 
development [of filters] by industry, and [the] use [of filters] by parents”). 
 173. Id. at 2791.  The Court expressly stated that its holding was confined to the interlocutory 
matter and that it confined its rationale narrowly as well, deciding the matter “on a narrower, 
more specific grounds than the rationale the Court of Appeals adopted.”  Id. 
 174. Id. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority “in subjecting COPA to strict 
scrutiny” because “[n]othing in the First Amendment entitles the type of material covered by 
COPA to that exacting standard of review”). 
 175. Id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer notes that COPA’s terms, which the 
Court of Appeals found too broad, are nearly identical to those validated as narrow enough in 
Miller.  Thus, Justice Breyer finds a narrowing construction to be a valuable analysis.  Ashcroft II, 
124 S.Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Corne-Revere, supra note 14, at 324  (noting 
Justice Breyer’s concerted effort to narrowly read COPA: “Justice Breyer’s dissent is remarkable 
for its unusual reading of the ‘harmful to minors’ standard. His effort to bring a heightened level 
of precision and to narrow the variable obscenity standard is a worthy goal . . .”). 
 176. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2795. 
 177. Id. 
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“some Members of the Court . . . [may] have taken the view that the First 
Amendment simply does not permit Congress to legislate this area.”178  
However, Justice Breyer states that if that view is the impetus for the 
majority’s decision, then the Court should have indicated that to Congress in 
Ashcroft II.179 
B. Role of Federal Government in Internet Regulation 
As Justice Breyer suggests in his dissent, the reasoning behind the 
majority’s decision in Ashcroft II may be that the majority believes that the 
federal government has no place, no constitutional role, in directly regulating 
the Internet.180  Illustrative of this are the majority’s statements indicating a 
preference for end regulation, such as filters, that “impose selective 
restrictions . . . at the receiving end,” as opposed to source regulation, such as 
COPA, that imposes “universal restrictions” on internet providers that are 
enforced by the government through criminal and civil sanctions.181  If the 
Court prefers end regulation to direct government control at the source of 
online pornography, then the Court takes the primary responsibility for 
protecting children from harmful Internet materials out of the government’s 
hands. 
Confirming this position in his concurrence, Justice Stevens finds that it is 
parents’ responsibility to protect children from harmful Internet material.  
Taking issue with COPA’s imposition of civil and criminal liability on 
offenders, Justice Stevens explains his “growing sense of unease when the 
interest in protecting children from prurient materials is invoked as a 
justification for using criminal regulation of speech as a substitute for, or a 
simple backup to, adult oversight of children’s view habits.” 182  Further, in 
support of end regulation as a preferable alternative to COPA, the majority 
explains that parents can turn on filters when children use the computer and 
then turn off “the filter on their home computers” to “obtain access” to 
otherwise filtered speech.183  Clearly, the majority sends the message that 
parents, not the government, are to be their children’s censors. 184  Having 
implied that the government lacks a direct role in Internet regulation, the 
Supreme Court has demoted the societal interest in shielding children from 
 
 178. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (“I recognize that some Members of the Court, now or in the past, have taken the 
view that the First Amendment simply does not permit Congress to legislate in this area”). 
 181. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792. 
 182. Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 183. Id. at 2792. 
 184. See In Loco Parentis, N.J. L. J. , Jul. 5, 2004, at 22 (arguing that the Ashcroft II decision 
communicates that “[i]n a free society, parents must be their children’s censors: Censorship is not 
a job for the federal government”). 
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online pornography, sending the message that the goal of COPA is not 
urgent.185 
Considering that the Ashcroft II Court seems to imply that the government 
lacks a direct role in Internet regulation, why did the Ashcroft II Court not 
direct Congress to stop wasting its time attempting to enact a statute aimed at 
protecting children from pornography dependent on direct government 
regulation?  In his dissent, Justice Breyer asks this question as well and, not 
finding an answer, states that if the Court feels that the federal government 
should not regulate Internet speech, it “should say so clearly.”186  Until the 
Court clearly states its position, Congress will not know whether to continue to 
enact legislation concerning Internet regulation through direct governmental 
enforcement. 
C. Filters vs. COPA 
Based on the evidence before them, the Ashcroft II majority found that 
filters may be a less restrictive alternative to COPA, 187 and thereby, that the 
government may have no direct role in Internet censorship.188  The following 
section analyzes this finding by 1) providing an empirical study of filters and, 
based on this exemplar, analyzing 2) whether the volitional use of filters is an 
effective means of controlling children’s access to harmful Internet 
pornography, and 3) whether filters are less restrictive of legitimate speech. 
The following study evaluates the effectiveness of filters by analyzing the 
content of information blocked by filters, that is, the relative amounts of 
pornography versus the amounts of non-obscene, legitimate speech blocked by 
filters.189  This study also presents an accurate portrayal of how most filters 
work: filters usually operate on some form of word-blocking; users turn on a 
 
 185. See id. (arguing that by implying that the government lacks a direct role in Internet 
regulation, the Ashcroft II Court indicates that “[a]cting in loco parentis is not the most effective 
use of Congress’s time”). 
 186. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 2795. 
On this record, the Government has not shown that the less restrictive alternatives 
proposed by respondents should be disregarded.  Those alternatives, indeed, may be more 
effective than the provisions of COPA.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion 
when it entered the preliminary injunction.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Id. 
 188. See In Loco Parentis, supra note 184, at 22 (arguing that the Ashcroft II decision 
communicates that “[i]n a free society, parents must be their children’s censors: Censorship is not 
a job for the federal government”). 
 189. See Kate Reder, Ashcroft v. ACLU: Should Congress Try, Try, and Try Again, or Does 
the International Problem of Regulating Internet Pornography Require an International 
Solution?, 6 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 139, 148 (2004) (summarizing the purpose and results of the 
study). 
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filter and may set the level of blocking desired, from a very restrictive 
configuration to a less restrictive setting.190 
The Kaiser Family Foundation conducted a study, (“Kaiser study”), that 
tested the material blocked from various websites, including general health, 
sexual health, and pornography websites, by different filtering devices set at 
different configurations.  The study found that when the setting was less 
restrictive, the filters failed to block much pornography but allowed more 
legitimate speech from non-pornographic sites.  When the setting was more 
restrictive, the filters successfully blocked more pornography but erroneously 
blocked more legitimate materials.  Even at the least restrictive setting, the 
filters incorrectly blocked about one out of ten non-pornographic, health-
related websites.  Thus, a parent wishing to screen pornography on a child’s 
computer who sets the filter’s configuration to the most restrictive level can 
expect the filter to incorrectly block an average of 24 percent of non-
pornographic, legitimate websites.191 These results have been confirmed by 
many studies, including those of the Computer Science and 
Telecommunications Board working in conjunction with the National Research 
Council.192 
The Kaiser study illustrates the debate over filters’ effectiveness: filters are 
potentially underinclusive, failing to block a significant amount of Internet 
pornography, and overinclusive, blocking constitutionally protected speech 
such as every instance of the word “breast” and thus, all breast cancer 
websites.193  The report by Computer Science and Telecommunications Board 
 
 190. See id. See also Kosse, supra note 30, at 738-39 (describing the two categories of 
filtering software: “predetermined blocking filters,” which require a user to select one of five 
methods by which to block speech, or “rate-based filters,” which allow users “to rate sites by 
creating descriptive labels”). For a thorough report on protecting children from Internet 
pornography, including extensive analyses of filtering technologies, see YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, 
AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 51. 
 191. See Reder, supra note 189, at 148 (summarizing the Kaiser study and arguing that the 
results demonstrate that filters block obscene materials at the high price of blocking non-obscene, 
legitimate speech as well).  To view the complete study, see The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation, See No Evil: How Internet Filters Affect the Search for Online Health Information, at 
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/Internet_Filtering_exec_summ.pdf 
(Dec. 2002). 
 192. See YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 58 ( “All of the 
technologies of filtering that are discussed above have inherent uncertainties associated with 
them, which lead them to make errors of both commission (misinterpreting a site as 
inappropriate) or omission (not identifying an inappropriate site”); Kosse, supra note 30, at 739 
(“Many of the [filtering] programs use some form of word-blocking that often leads to the 
overinclusive blocking of constitutionally protected material . . . Critics of filtering software 
argue that this technology can be underinclusive as well”). 
 193. See Kosse, supra note 30, at 739. 
[M]any of the [filtering] programs use some form of word blocking that often leads to the 
overinclusive blocking of constitutionally protected material.  For example, certain 
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and the National Research Council concluded that filters were inherently 
fallible in terms of “overblocking” and “underblocking.”194  The report found 
that, “[d]ue to the nature of filtering, these two types of errors are inevitable[,]” 
and while “[i]t is possible to adjust” one’s filter “such that the occurrence of 
one type of error is reduced[,] . . . reducing one type of error will always result 
in increasing the other type of error.”195  Parents have also agreed with such 
findings, concluding that filters are not sufficient means of addressing the 
problem of children’s exposure to online pornography.196 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer argues that this recognized ineffectiveness of 
filters impelled efforts to design a statute allowing for direct government 
regulation, efforts which resulted in COPA’s promulgation. 197  The Ashcroft II 
majority disagreed with Justice Breyer’s assertion that filters were the status 
quo and suggested that the government can implement incentive programs 
encouraging the use of filtering software, thereby raising the bar above the 
status quo.198  Indeed, Congress will likely respond to the majority’s 
suggestion by enacting such an incentive program.199 
 
programs banned the word “breast,” unintentionally blocking all websites dealing with 
breast cancer.  Critics of filtering software argue that this technology can be 
underinclusive as well. 
Id. 
 194. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 58. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
[F]iltering software depends on parents willing to decide where their children will surf the 
Web and able to enforce that decision.  As to millions of American families, that is not a 
“reasonable possibility” because “[m]ore than 28 million school age children have both 
parents or their sole parent in the work force, at least 5 million children are left alone at 
home without supervision each week, and many of those children will spend afternoons 
and evenings with friends who may well have access to computers and more lenient 
parents.” 
Id. See also YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 161.  This report 
explained that “filters cannot guarantee that inappropriate material will not be accessed” and thus 
require adult supervision to ensure such.  Id. at 304.  Considering that the “number of unmarried-
partner homes increased by 60 percent” from 1999 to 2000, parents are increasingly unable to 
supervise their children’s computer usage. Id. at 161. 
 197. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Filtering software . . . suffers 
from . . . serious inadequacies that prompted Congress to pass legislation instead of relying on its 
voluntary use”). 
 198. Id. at 2793 (stating that Congress can “take steps to promote [the] development [of 
filters] by industry, and [the] use [of filters] by parents . . . [i]t is incorrect, for that reason, to say 
that filters are part of the current regulatory status quo”). 
 199. For a discussion of this issue, see Reder, supra note 189, at 147 (discussing the 
likelihood of Congress providing incentives for the use of filters based on the holding in Ashcroft 
II and that of American Library, where the Court held that public libraries’ use of Internet 
filtering software did not violate patrons’ First Amendment rights and, therefore, CIPA did not 
violate the Constitution) (citing American Library, 539 U.S. at 212). 
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However, as suggested by the Kaiser study, filters have inherent 
deficiencies that, even with incentive programs encouraging their use, render 
filters less effective than COPA.200  Source regulation, such as COPA, does not 
depend on filter-like machines that are fundamentally ill-equipped to 
distinguish between context-dependent meanings of words, but rather it 
requires online pornography providers themselves to employ age verification 
systems that patrons must bypass before access is allowed.201Fundamentally, 
encouraging more people to use filters more often will not affect their inherent 
fallibility.  Thereby, incentive programs that encourage widespread filter use 
will not raise filters, as inherently fallible machines, above the filter-inclusive 
status quo existing before COPA’s enactment. 
Based on his finding that a filtering status quo is less effective than COPA, 
Justice Breyer presented a convincing and interesting argument criticizing the 
majority’s conclusion that filters are less restrictive than COPA.202  Justice 
Breyer found that the majority, by inquiring as to whether a filtering status quo 
is less restrictive than COPA, is essentially asking: Is it less restrictive to do 
nothing (leave the filtering status quo alone) than to allow COPA to take effect 
(thereby increasing the level of protection from that of a filtering status 
quo)?203 
Thus, conceptually, by finding filters are a less restrictive alternative to 
COPA, the majority affirms the current regulatory status quo, one that, in the 
words of Justice Breyer, “does not solve the ‘child protection’ problem.”204  
 
 200. See Reder, supra note 189, at 148 (summarizing the Kaiser study and arguing that the 
results demonstrate that filters block obscene materials at the high price of blocking non-obscene, 
legitimate speech as well).  See also YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, 
at 58 (concluding that filters are inherently fallible in terms of “overblocking” and 
“underblocking” and finding that, “[d]ue to the nature of filtering, these two types of errors are 
inevitable” and while “[i]t is possible to adjust” one’s filter “such that the occurrence of one type 
of error is reduced . . . reducing one type of error will always result in increasing the other type of 
error”). 
 201. Carrie Netterville-Heieck, Note, Ashcroft v. ACLU: Protecting Our Children From 
Harmful Online Material Without Infringing Upon First Amendment Rights, 4 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 95, 110 (2004) (explaining that COPA would require “age and identity 
verification . . . to access adult Web sites”).  For a thorough explanation of the various kinds of 
age verification software, see YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 59. 
 202. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2801-02. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. In his dissent, Justice Breyer, discussing the majority’s position that filters are a 
reasonable alternative to COPA, stated that filters are: 
part of the status quo, i.e., the backdrop against which Congress enacted [COPA].  It is 
always true, by definition, that the status quo is less restrictive than a new regulatory law.  
It is always less restrictive to do nothing than to do something.  But “doing nothing” does 
not address the problem Congress sought to address—namely that, despite the availability 
of filtering software, children were still being exposed to harmful material on the Internet. 
Id. 
 204. Id. at 2802. 
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Irrespective of whether Congress enacts incentive legislation, parents should 
be concerned that the Ashcroft II Court has affirmed the inherent fallibility of 
filters, the status quo against which COPA was enacted, as a more effective 
and less restrictive means of protecting children from online pornography. 
D. The Supreme Court’s Protectivism of the Internet 
While the majority and dissenting opinions in Ashcroft II clashed on 
almost all points, from whether the Court should have decided the case on the 
merits to whether COPA was more or less effective than filters,205 the Court 
“achieved a near consensus” regarding the use of strict scrutiny to evaluate 
COPA.206  Only Justice Scalia advocated a less rigorous level of scrutiny.207 
The use of strict scrutiny in evaluating content-based restriction of sexual 
speech has not always been the approach employed by the Court.208  The Court 
usually regards obscene, sexually explicit speech as deserving only minimal 
protection and therefore the Court will attempt to use a less stringent standard 
in evaluating proposed restrictions on such speech.209  But faced with new and 
different communication mediums, the Court has recently used a strict scrutiny 
approach to content-based restrictions, thereby setting forth a major change in 
the law with implications that would seem to limit future government attempts 
to regulate sexual speech.210  In choosing to analyze COPA through the most 
 
 205. For an interesting theory as to the reasons for the differences between the majority and 
dissenters in Ashcroft II, see Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 322.  Corn-Revere postulates: 
The difference between the Ashcroft II majority and the dissenters is even more extreme 
than to say that for one side the glass is half full and for the other it is half empty.  The 
majority position is akin to saying that nothing prevents parents from getting a glass of 
water if they want one.  But to the dissenters, no such thing as a glass exists unless the 
government provides it.  To the extent the “glass” in this metaphor is the existence of 
Internet filtering software, the divergent perspectives of the justices significantly affect 
their respective evaluations of the technology. 
Id. 
 206. Id. at 321 (stating that the Ashcroft II justices, “achieved a near consensus . . . that 
regulating expression on the internet in the interest of protecting children requires the government 
to satisfy strict First Amendment scrutiny”). 
 207. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority “in 
subjecting COPA to strict scrutiny” because “[n]othing in the First Amendment entitles the type 
of material covered by COPA to that exacting standard of review”).  See also Corn-Revere, supra 
note 14, at 321 (“Justice Scalia is the sole holdout for a less rigorous standard of review . . .”). 
 208. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[Ashcroft II] is notable because the Court used 
strict scrutiny in evaluating government regulation of sexual speech.  Traditionally, non-obscene 
sexual speech has been regarded as having little value and has been only minimally protected.”). 
 209. Id.  See, e.g., Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (holding that obscene speech is not 
afforded First Amendment protection and the government can thus regulate obscenity). 
 210. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333-34.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 868-69.  The 
Court utilized a strict scrutiny approach in analyzing CDA.  In choosing to apply “the most 
stringent review” of CDA, the Reno Court pointed out the importance of the Internet as a new, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
510 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:477 
stringent lens available, the Ashcroft II Court conveyed a deliberate 
protectivism of the Internet medium. 211 
Speculation abounds as to the potential motivations for the Court’s 
protectivism of the Internet.  Perhaps this protectivism can be explained by 
analyzing the nature of the Internet as an expressive medium.  The nature of 
the Internet medium is quite different from other more traditional media such 
as the telephone and radio.212  Certainly, the scope and range of 
communications possible over the Internet are vast and ever expanding.213  In 
fact, the Internet was designed to be borderless, so as to allow global access 
and avoid obstructions.214  This knowledge alone might lead the Court to be 
wary of allowing regulatory attempts to reign-in an area of communications 
with such new and indiscernible boundaries.215 
Exacerbating the problems encountered from the nature of the Internet as 
an ever-expanding medium is the extremely complex nature of that which 
COPA seeks to regulate.  The Court has always approached content-based 
speech restrictions cautiously, but even more so is the Court wary of the 
regulation of sexually explicit material.216  Formulating a constitutional statute 
that regulates sexually explicit material is exceedingly difficult, requiring 
legislators to “settle in the abstract upon a constitutionally acceptable category 
of material that should be withheld from children,” which is problematic 
 
immensely wide-ranging medium that, unlike radio or television, is less invasive because 
communications over the Internet do not appear on an individual’s computer unbidden.  Id. 
 211. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[Ashcroft II] is important because the Supreme 
Court is once again being very protective of the internet as a medium for communication and 
restrictive as to the government’s ability to regulate it”). 
 212. YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET, supra note 29, at 32-33, 35 (listing the key 
features of the internet medium that distinguish it from other, more traditional media, including 
that the internet 1) “supports a high degree of interactivity,” 2) “is high decentralized,” 3) “is 
intrinsically a highly anonymous medium,” and 4) “is a highly convenient medium”).  The report 
also asserts that the “capital costs of becoming an Internet publisher are relatively low” and that 
“because nearly anyone can put information onto the Internet, the appropriateness, utility, and 
even veracity of information on the Internet are generally uncertified and hence unverified.” Id. at 
35. 
 213. See Kosse, supra note 30, at 721.  Kosse comments on the expansive nature of the 
Internet, stating that “[i]n 2002, the Internet was made up of more than 600 million users 
worldwide[,]” and “[t]here are now more than 150 countries linked by the Internet.”  Id. 
 214. Reder, supra note 189, at 146 & nn. 7 & 55 (“The Internet was designed both for global 
access and to avoid obstructions; it is borderless”) (citing Parry Aftab, White Paper, Thinking 
Outside the ‘Porn’ Box, Separating the Sexual Content Debate from Issues Relating to 
Marketing, Commercial Practices, and Child Exploitation, at www.wiredsafety.org/resources/ 
pdf/xxx_whitepaper.pdf (April 2004)). 
 215. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2794 (acknowledging that “[t]he technology of the Internet 
evolves at a rapid pace”). 
 216. James, supra note 159, at S10 (“[Ashcroft II] represents an important reminder of the 
justices’ long-standing suspicious attitude against content-based restrictions on speech”). 
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considering “the geographic variation within the United States among 
standards for assessing such material and the fact that so much covered 
material originates abroad . . . .”217  Thus, the complex, hard-to-define nature 
of both the Internet and sexually explicit material might render the Court 
suspect of any legislative attempt at regulation on both fronts. 
While the Court has not revealed its motivations behind affording the 
Internet a high level of constitutional protection, after Ashcroft II little doubt 
remains that the Court plans on treating the Internet very differently than other 
media.  In the past, the Court extended First Amendment protection to then-
new technologies, namely radio, television, and cable television, only after 
much reservation and debate. 218  However, faced with the newest technology 
of the Internet, the Court has not hesitated to immediately apply the highest 
level of constitutional protection.219 
E. When COPA Next Faces the Supreme Court 
Any Supreme Court case decided by a 5-4 majority presents the possibility 
that if the issue comes before the Court again, the passage of time or a change 
in the composition of the Court might tip the scale in a different direction.220  
As COPA’s fate is currently undecided, the issue of COPA’s constitutionality 
will almost definitely come before the Supreme Court again.221  When it does, 
1) President George W. Bush may have had nominated a new justice to the 
 
 217. Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw’s Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1375, 1458 n.353 (2004) (citing Ashcroft II as an example of a case were filtering was found an 
attractive alternative “to direct regulation of sexually explicit content” because of the 
complexities involved in regulating sexually explicit material). 
 218. Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 309-10. 
Importantly, the majority opinion [of Ashcroft II] reaffirmed the high level of 
constitutional protection that the Court has accorded the Internet.  This view of 
technology and the First Amendment fundamentally reverses the approach the Court took 
regarding speech transmitted via new communications technologies in the decades before 
Reno v. ACLU.  With other media, when they were new, the Court only grudgingly and 
incrementally extended First Amendment protections. 
Id. 
 219. Id. at 310 (“[W]ith the debut of the internet, the Court stressed that ‘our cases provide no 
basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this 
medium’”). 
 220. Craft, supra note 22, at 15 (“Not infrequently, the court decides cases by a 5-4 vote” and 
thus, when such a decision goes before the Court again, “[a] one-vote swing could shift the 
balance” on a particular issue). 
 221. Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 320.  Corn-Revere comments that on COPA’s status: 
“[b]ecause the Court affirmed only the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction, 
all of the issues that go to the merits still must be decided.”  Id. 
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Court, and 2) the cutting-edge technology issues involved in Ashcroft II will 
likely have evolved.222 
Even before the most recent presidential election, scholars and political 
analysts emphasized that the outcome of the election would have great 
implications in terms of changes in the Supreme Court’s composition.223  The 
re-election of the conservative President George W. Bush, and his almost 
certain opportunity to fill at least one vacancy on the Supreme Court, has great 
implications as to how COPA’s constitutionality will be resolved.224  President 
Bush’s choice in a Supreme Court replacement will certainly test his 
conservative commitment as well as his post-election promise to Democrats: 
“Americans are expecting a bipartisan effort.” 225  Liberal groups predict that 
President Bush, in facing such a test, will likely chose a conservative 
candidate, especially if he is called to replace the conservative Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.226 
However, an analysis of how a change in the Supreme Court might affect 
COPA based on conservative or liberal tendencies might not be constructive.  
Usually, in order of most conservative to least, the line-up of the justices are as 
follows: 1) Justice Thomas, 2) Justice Scalia, 3) Justice Rehnquist, 4) Justice 
Kennedy, 5) Justice O’Connor, 6) Justice Breyer, 7) Justice Souter, 8) Justice 
Ginsburg, and 9) Justice Stevens.227  Ashcroft II serves as an example of a 5-4 
opinion with no clear-cut conservative-liberal line: the 5-4 opinion was written 
by Justice Kennedy (middle), joined by Justices Stevens (liberal), Souter 
(liberal), Thomas (conservative), and Ginsburg (liberal), with whom Justices 
 
 222. Id. at 326. (“Much can happen as [Ashcroft II] makes its way through the lower courts, 
including a potential change in the composition of the Supreme Court”). 
 223. The Presidential Election: How Will the Outcome Shape Our Legal System?, THE 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 1, 2004, at 2 (arguing that the outcome of the 2004 election will 
influence the legal system in terms of who the President will nominate for high court). See also 
Tony Mauro, Judge Battles Likely to Mark Bush’s New Term, THE RECORDER, Nov. 8, 2004, at 1 
(speculating that President Bush’s “presidential term [may be] marked by judicial confirmation 
battles that rival or exceed in intensity those of Bush’s first term”). 
 224. See Craft, supra note 22, at 15 (“[C]ourt watchers predict that the winner of the 2004 
presidential election will likely name two or more justices and leave his mark on the court for a 
generation”). 
 225. Mauro, supra note 223, at 1 (“When or if a Rehnquist replacement is named, liberal 
groups are gearing up for battle, in case Bush’s olive branch, offered to Democrats in post-
election remarks, does not extend to nominations. ‘Americans are expecting a bipartisan effort 
and results,’ Bush said . . .”). 
 226. Id. (“Liberal groups are skeptical of Bush’s comments, given the sharply conservative 
bent of some of his first-term judicial nominees”). 
 227. E-mail from Roger Goldman, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, 
to Anne S. Johnston, law student, Saint Louis University School of Law  (Tuesday, Nov. 16, 2004 
3:35 PM CST) (on file with author).  Goldman noted that Justice Kennedy may sometimes “flip 
flop with O’Connor depending on issue.”  Id. 
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Scalia (conservative), Breyer (liberal), Rehnquist (conservative) and O’Connor 
(middle) dissented.228 
Political party support of COPA has also crossed traditional conservative-
liberal distinctions.  Although the typical stereotype is that liberals oppose and 
conservatives support COPA and related censorship issues,229 in many respects 
support of COPA has been bipartisan.  COPA was introduced in the Senate by 
Republican Senator Dan Coats of Indiana.230  In the House, Republican 
Representative Michael Oxley sponsored a near-identical bill.231  Democrat 
President Bill Clinton signed COPA into law.232 
Thus, while it is sure that President Bush will likely have an opportunity to 
nominate at least one justice to the Supreme Court, the effect of his choice of a 
conservative or a liberal appointment remains uncertain.  When it comes to the 
First Amendment issues like COPA, the justices do not follow a strictly 
conservative or liberal voting pattern.233 
Further, the passage of time between the Court’s recent decision to remand 
Ashcroft II and when the Court faces COPA again might change the views of 
some of the justices.  The Ashcroft II Court stated specifically that among its 
reasons for remanding the case was the practical justification that a remand 
would allow the parties to present updated technological data regarding filters 
and the Internet.234  Having a history of approaching the ever-changing Internet 
medium with extreme caution,235 perhaps the justices need time to get 
comfortable with the cutting-edge technology of the Internet and to understand 
it as more than an abstract, malleable medium before deciding whether it can 
be regulated.  The scope of the Court’s analysis, curtailing the possible means 
of protecting children from online pornography to one end of the spectrum or 
the other, namely to either source regulation, like COPA, or end regulation, 
like filters,236 indicates a narrow perception of the vastness of the Internet, of 
the “grey” areas of cyberspace.  If and when the justices do get acclimated to 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Reder, supra note 189, at 151 (discussing how “liberal voices [usually] join the debate 
by invoking the slippery slope of censorship”). 
 230. Wilt, supra note 20, at 378 (detailing the legislative history of COPA). 
 231. Id. at 378-79. 
 232. Id. at 376. 
 233. E-mail from Roger Goldman, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, 
to Anne S. Johnston, law student, Saint Louis University School of Law,  (Tuesday, Nov. 16, 
2004 3:35 PM CST) (on file with author). 
 234. Id. at  2794. 
 235. Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[Ashcroft II] is important because the Supreme 
Court is once again being very protective of the internet as a medium for communication and 
restrictive as to the government’s ability to regulate it”). 
 236. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792 (finding that filters “impose selective restrictions on 
speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source”). 
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the Internet, their views regarding whether the government can constitutionally 
regulate the Internet might broaden. 
F. Where Does Congress Go From Here? 
Perhaps a more illuminating question is: how did the Supreme Court 
expect Congress to use and interpret the Ashcroft II holding?  Considering the 
narrow practical focus of the Ashcroft II decision, there is no simple answer.237 
Indeed, Congress’ expectations from Ashcroft II were quite different than 
the result. Congress enacted COPA in response to the Court’s directives in 
Reno that specifically addressed those aspects of CDA which rendered it 
unconstitutional.238  Certainly the government expected that COPA would be 
challenged by the ACLU and other groups.239  Undoubtedly, Congress 
expected that whatever the outcome of such litigation, however long such 
litigation lasted, there would eventually be an outcome: the Court would tell 
Congress if and why COPA is or is not constitutional.  But after years of 
COPA litigation and having reached the Supreme Court twice, the Court has 
again failed to provide Congress with any such insight, and as COPA begins its 
third climb from the lower courts up, Congress is left wondering if there is an 
end to the litigation process.240 
What Congress can take from Ashcroft II is the understanding that the 
Court has reservations, albeit unexplained reservations, about direct, source 
regulation of the Internet by the government and, in lieu of such direct control, 
seems more than ready to endorse filters as an alternative.241  Further, the 
 
 237. See Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 299 (describing Ashcroft II’s ruling as one of 
“narrow practical focus”). 
 238. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 885.  The majority states that 
“[i]n enacting COPA, Congress gave consideration to our earlier decisions on this subject, in 
particular the decision in Reno.”  Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2788.  See also id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). Justice Breyer’s dissent notes that “Congress passed [COPA] in response to the 
Court’s decision in Reno . . . .”  Id. 
 239. See Wilt, supra note 20, at 375 (“Unsurprisingly, the availability of pornography on the 
Internet has led to extensive public criticism and, more importantly, to numerous legislative 
attempts to restrict, regulate, reduce, burden and ban it.  These endeavors have met with 
consistent and considerable opposition . . .”).  In describing CDA’s procedural history, Wilt notes 
that, “[a]s is typical for an indecency statute, [after CDA was enacted] twenty plaintiffs 
immediately filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the CDA, and alleging that it violated 
the First and Fifth Amendments.” Id. at 376. 
 240. See Corn-Revere, supra note 14, at 320 (“The [Ashcroft II] Court remanded the case to 
update the factual record on technological developments relevant to its least restrictive means 
analysis, but none of the issues that relate to the ultimate question of COPA’s constitutionality 
have been resolved.  Because the Court affirmed only the district court’s decision to issue a 
preliminary injunction, all of the issues that go to the merits still must be decided”) (emphasis 
added). 
 241. See Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2792 (finding that filters “impose selective restrictions on 
speech at the receiving end, not universal restrictions at the source”). See supra text 
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Court displays a protectivism of the Internet which can be best explained by a 
Court who views the Internet medium with trepidation,242 so unwilling to reach 
within its nebulous boundaries that the Court prefers to remand the issue of 
COPA’s constitutionality to the lower courts before making any decisions 
regarding source regulation of the Internet. 
In the meantime, while Congress waits for a substantive decision on the 
merits, maybe it will, as the Ashcroft II majority suggested,243 enact incentive 
programs encouraging filter usage.244  The court has upheld such programs 
recently in application to libraries.245  But, inevitably, any incentive enactment 
that extends beyond libraries will be challenged, sparking the litigation process 
anew.246  Congress, confident that filters are not a solution to the problem,247  
no doubt views any such incentive program as only temporary and only a 
distant second place behind direct governmental regulation of the Internet. 
However, perhaps incentive programs can, in the long run, give Congress 
the ammunition it needs to convince the Court that filters are not effective 
alternatives.  Comprehensive data that might be compiled from such programs 
may persuasively establish filters as an inadequate alternative to direct 
governmental control.  Unfortunately, this possibility is, at best, an optimistic 
hope for an outcome of Ashcroft II, and, at worst, a fanciful and completely 
 
accompanying note 236 (“The scope of the [Ashcroft II] Court’s analysis, curtailing the possible 
means of protecting children from online pornography to . . . either “source” regulation, like 
COPA, or “end” regulation, like filters, indicates a narrow perception of the . . . “grey” areas of 
cyberspace.  If and when the justices do get acclimated to the internet, their views regarding 
whether the government can constitutionally regulate the internet might broaden”). 
 242. See Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 333 (“[Ashcroft II] is important because the Supreme 
Court is once again being very protective of the internet as medium for communication and 
restrictive as to the government’s ability to regulate it”). 
 243. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2793 (stating that Congress can “take steps to promote [the] 
development [of filters] by industry, and [the] use [of filters] by parents”). 
 244. For a discussion of this issue, see Reder, supra note 189, at 147 (discussing the 
likelihood of Congress providing incentives for the use of filters based on the holding in Ashcroft 
II and that of American Library  (where the Court held that “‘[b]ecause public libraries’ use of 
Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons’ First Amendment rights, CIPA does not 
violate the Constitution . . .’”) (quoting American Library, 539 U.S. at 212 (2003)). 
 245. American Library, 539 U.S. at 194, 212 (upholding as constitutional the Children’s 
Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”), which mandates that a public library may not receive some 
types of Internet-related federal assistance unless that library’s internet safety policy includes 
protective technology such as filters).  For the complete CIPA statute, see 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) 
(2003) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2002). 
 246. See Reder, supra note 189, at 147 (describing the legislation-followed-by-litigation 
process of Internet regulation: “The Internet pornography industry is involved in a cat-and-mouse 
game with those who try to regulate it”). 
 247. Ashcroft II, 124 S.Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Filtering software . . . suffers 
from . . . serious inadequacies that prompted Congress to pass legislation instead of relying on its 
voluntary use”). 
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unfounded speculation.  One outcome of Ashcroft II is definite: there is no end 
in sight for the problem of children’s exposure to online pornography. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The problem that COPA aims to address, that of children’s exposure to 
online pornography, is an immediate and urgent crisis.  Undoubtedly, 
Congress, parents, and the Internet industry as a whole would have preferred 
that the Ashcroft II Court decided COPA’s constitutionality, stating clearly 
what its decision implies, that the government has no role in regulating the 
internet, rather than Ashcroft II’s narrow, practical decision.  By endorsing 
filters, which either overblock legitimate speech or underblock pornography, 
and upholding the injunction prohibiting COPA from taking effect, the 
Ashcroft II Court neither protected children nor protected speech.  Truly, the 
Ashcroft II decision frustrates to its core the congressional effort behind 
COPA’s enactment. 
It is no wonder that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress 
is left disgruntled and confused.  Indeed, in enacting COPA, Congress did 
exactly what the Court told it to do in Reno.  Nevertheless, after years of 
litigation, the Court has twice refused to comment on COPA’s constitutionality 
and now has stated in Ashcroft II that filters might be a less restrictive 
alternative, an implication that effectively leaves COPA with uncertain, 
doubtful constitutional viability.  The government is left trying to tread water 
with a law that is no longer afloat until it reaches the Supreme Court again, and 
even then the Court might still harbor trepidation of the Internet as an 
uncharted ocean of communication. 
Meanwhile, Congress has no promising options: it can hope that a 
favorable re-balancing of Ashcroft II’s  5-4 scales might occur before the Court 
faces COPA again, or Congress might attempt to pass incentive programs to 
encourage filter use.  Considering that Congress has no faith in filters’ ability 
to address the online pornography problem, such programs seem doomed from 
the start.  But while waiting for COPA’s slow assent to the Supreme Court, 
Congress will likely go forward with filter incentive legislation as opposed to 
waiting for an official Court ruling on COPA.  Undoubtedly, Congress 
understands that the Ashcroft II Court, in choosing to remand rather than 
decide COPA’s fate, likely wanted to let the lower courts grapple with COPA’s 
constitutionality first before making their own decision regarding the 
regulation of the Internet’s vast technological terrain. 
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